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The search of a more rational and equitable
World order, which the south has pursued
for so long, requires a more effectively organized
south to present its case and negotiate
its demands in world fora [...]It is necessary
that the south should speak with one voice.
[South Commission]
There exists a close relationship between the poverty level of developing coun-
tries and the restrictions that hamper the trade of agricultural products. Within 
the main restrictions that distort the global markets of those products we find 
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, production and exportation subsidies, among oth-
ers. These measures damaged the increase of the exportations and inhibit the 
possibility of growth of developing economies. In spite of this, industrialized 
countries have shown a great resistance to abandon those measures. As op-
posed to what happened with the trade of industrial products, the liberalization 
of the trade of agricultural products has never been managed within the frame 
of multilateral agreements. In this way, from World War II an international trade 
regime has been consolidating with great benefits for the developed economies 
but against weaker countries.
In the international trade negotiations developed under the General Agree-
ment on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) the areas of interest of industrialized countries 
were privileged, that is to say, those characterized by the intra-industrial spe-
cialization, scale economies, and product differentiation. However, when the 
inter-industrial characteristics dominated the trade currents, tariffs were high 
while non-tariff restrictions and other distorted practices multiplied.
This shows that free trade is not working for the majority in the world. 
The reality of the world economy has very little to do with the free markets, it is 
characterized by the neo-mercantilist strategy of the main world power centers. 
Neo-mercantilism supposes a double-end strategy, on one side, the protection 
of the great powers towards the domestic capitalists that are not competitive; on 
the other, abroad, the forced opening of the Third World Countries. In fact, while 
the great powers spend millions of dollars, euro and yens to subsidy directly or 
indirectly producers and exporters, they established, at the same time, a great 
variety of protectionist measures to restrict or exclude the imports from Third 
World Countries (Petras, 2002:33).
To this respect, the interesting fact about the process of forced liberalization 
is the acknowledgement that the developed countries promoted the systematic 
application of opening policies in the periphery of the capitalistic system, while 
they kept for themselves the right to strongly protect certain huge areas of their 
economies. In fact, “commercial liberalization, which supposedly was to be 
matched by an equivalent movement practiced by developed economies at 
the capitalist core turned out to be an autistic gesture, with catastrophic con-
sequences in the levels of employment of our societies” (Borón, 2005:148).
The foregoing situation forces the developing countries to face a great 
challenge, that is: the possibility of positioning themselves collectively and firmly 
against the arbitrariness imposed by the developed countries in the frame of 
institutions that have been traditionally used only for the benefit of their closest 
interests. Summing up, what comes into play is the possibility of reverting, at 
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least partially, the asymmetric game that has traditionally existed in the trade 
system of the world, according to which, the most powerful forces set the rules 
to which the most vulnerable and impoverished ones must subordinate.
Considering the importance that the trade of agricultural products for the 
developing countries has, the objective of this work is to deal with the position of 
the G-201 at the United States and the European Union, in the framework of the 
agricultural negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) corresponding 
to the Doha Round. This Group was established on 20 August 2003, in the final 
stages of the preparations for the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO, held in 
Cancun in September 2003. Since then, its focus has been on agriculture, one 
of the most important issues of the so called “Doha Development Agenda”.
The G-20 has a wide geographical representation, being integrated by 21 
member countries, five from Africa: Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe; six from Asia: China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines and 
Thailand, and ten from Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. According to its exten-
sion, the group comprises a substantial share of the world agricultural population, 
production and trade: 63% of all farmers and 51% of the world population live 
in the state members of the Group. It is also responsible for around 20% of the 
world agricultural production, 26% of the total agricultural exports and 17% of 
all the world imports of agricultural products.
From GATT to WTO: the Design of an Unfair Trade System
The trade system designed by the end of World War II originally included a system 
that would be administered by an International Trade Organization (ITO). The 
ITO was never completely realized and the only part of the system that started 
working was the portion that best suited the interest of the developed countries: 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. In the set of agreements that never 
worked we can find, among others, the one aimed at the stabilization of prices 
of basic products.
The idea of stabilizing commodity prices was killed when the United Sates 
congress refused to ratify the Havana Chapter. Consequently, the GATT had little 
authority to deal with questions concerning the development of the Third World 
countries. In order to modify this external scenario, in 1964 the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was established with the 
purpose of promoting development and trade, enhance economic cooperation 
among developing countries and help to re-dress the inequity in north – south 
economic relations. Besides, the conformation of the Group of 77 was recog-
nition by the south of the need for more organized solidarity. However, it was 
soon realized that developed countries were willing to consider only marginal 
changes in trading arrangements (South Commission, 1992).
The GATT had serious deficiencies, one of which was linked to the non-
inclusion of the agricultural area in the promoted agreements. The agricultural 
protectionism sought protection in the Article XI (“General elimination of quan-
titative restrictions”) and the XVI (Subsidies) that excepted agriculture from the 
prohibition of applying quantitative and non-tariff restrictions to the imports and 
the general prohibition of conceding subsidies to the exports. As a result of the 
application of these policies in the area and its consequences, that is overpro-
duction and artificial depression of prices in the non-protected international 
markets, exporting countries of agricultural products saw the reduction of their 
profit margins and of their participation in international markets.
1 Since its formation the group has suffered modifications changing the number of members, so we decided to 
call it G-20.
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The previous trend was closely linked to the usefulness that central coun-
tries traditionally gave to the international negotiations, which were conceived 
as means to the service of more powerful nations with the objective of imposing 
the conditions of a universal model that would determine the commercial and 
economics policy of developing countries. In this framework of adversities the 
integration and cooperation processes among countries with some similar needs 
were acquiring an important character, since they made their power of negotia-
tion in adverse situations better. So, the conformation of the Cairns Group2 in 
August 1986 had, as a result, that the agricultural problem was included in the 
multilateral negotiations during the Uruguay Round (1986 - 1994).
The Agricultural Agreement of 1994
The treatment on agriculture negotiated at the Uruguay Round had, as a result, 
the configuration of the Agricultural Agreement of 1994. The three main areas 
considered by the agreement were: access to markets, domestic support and 
export subsidies (OMC/WTO, 1995).
As regards access to markets, it was established that the access to mar-
kets of agricultural products was to be ruled only by a system of tariffs. In that 
way, the non-tariff measures were replaced by tariffs with equivalent protec-
tion level. The resulting tariffs, as well as the tariffs applied on other agricultural 
products, had to be reduced in 36% in the case of developed countries and in 
24% in developing countries. The reductions had to be made during a period of 
six years for developed countries and ten years for developing countries.
The measures for domestic support were subjected to reductions of 
the aggregate measurement of support or AMS. The assumed compromises 
demanded a reduction of 20% in the case of developed countries during a pe-
riod of six years, and of 13% in the developing countries during a period of ten 
years. The basic period upon which the reductions were to be calculated was 
1986-88. The Agreement on Agriculture classified the measures of domestic 
support to the production and commercialization of agricultural products in 
different compartments. These compartments or “boxes” were three: Amber 
Box, Green Box and Blue Box.
The measures of the Amber Box are considered harmful for the com-
merce; among them we can highlight: support prices, direct payments that 
affect the volume of production (or connected prices), and the subsidies to 
capitals, among others. These measures are subjected to progressive reduc-
tions and periodical revisions and are taken into account to calculate the AMS. 
The measures of the Green Box are those that have a minimum or no effect at 
all on production and commerce. It refers to general public services (research, 
struggle against diseases, food substructure and security), direct payments 
to producers (direct help to incomes that do not foster production) and direct 
payments in the framework of environmental programs. These measures are 
considered disconnected payments and they are free from reduction engage-
ments. Finally, the measures of the Blue Box are the direct payments that are 
made in the framework of programs that limit the production, based on surfaces 
and fixed profits. These payments are also free from reduction engagements.
2 The Cairns Group is currently integrated by: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and 
Uruguay. The Group had its inaugural meeting in Cairns -northern Queensland-, Australia in 1986. In that oppor-
tunity Ministers agreed to form an alliance to ensure that agricultural trade issues would be given a high priority 
in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations in Marrakesh, Cairns 
Group ministers agreed to maintain the Group and continue to pursue efforts for further agricultural reform.
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It is necessary to mention that in the framework of the measures of the 
Amber Box, the so called minimis clause consisting of an exception that states 
that the low rate subsidies are free from reduction or elimination was established. 
However, to be obtained, the support must not exceed the 5% of the total value 
of goods production in the case of the developed countries and 10% in the 
case of developing countries.
Finally, the agreement established compromises in relation to export sub-
sidies with the objective of reducing the quantity of money spent and the volume 
of subsidized exports. In the case of developing countries, the reductions were 
to be two thirds of those of developed countries and were to be made in a 
period of ten years.
Despite the importance of the agreement that was reached, the use of 
the 1986-1988 period as a reference point for the implementation of most of the 
compromises minimized their effect on the reduction of tariffs and subsidies. 
When taking into account a period of very low international prices, the equivalent 
tariffs and subsidies from which the reduction compromises were to be made 
turned to be very high. At the same time, very important deficiencies in the three 
main bases were observed, that is: access to markets, domestic support and 
export subsidies (Nogues, 2004).
As regards access to markets, it was observed, among other deficiencies, 
that the notified tariffs were higher (much higher in occasions) than the true ones 
that were equivalent to the non-tariff barriers ruling the base period. Thus, the 
reduction compromises were based on the levels corresponding to “dirty” tariffs 
and not to the true or real equivalents. In the access to markets there are also 
difficulties related to the Special Safeguards System3. The problematic situation 
is stated not only as regards the fact that they can be used without the damage 
proof, but also that certain countries which benefited from them have established 
activation prices that are very high over those established in the agreement.
In the case of domestic support, apart from the very important question of 
interpreting the compartments and the problem of the so called box shifting4, the 
compromise to reduce the AMS to a global level and not to a product level, meant 
in practice, the possibility of increasing the level of support to specific products.
Finally, in relation to export subsidies, apart from those enumerated explic-
itly in the agreement, there are others that, despite not being included and as a 
consequence not being subjected to reduction compromises produce strong 
damage to the trade of agricultural products.
As a consequence of the insufficiencies previously mentioned, the levels 
of help were kept very high. Japan has internal agricultural prices that are higher 
than the world average in a 170%, Europe in 83%, United States in 28% and 
Canada in 19%. This includes the transferences from the consumers to the 
producers due to tariff protection, as well as direct payments to agricultural 
products (Diaz Bonilla, 2001:47). Moreover, it is estimated that the industrial-
ized world spends $1 billion a day on agricultural subsidies. In 2002, United 
States farm support was 17,6% of the total value of agricultural production, in 
the European Union 36,5% and in Japan 59% (Lloney, 2004:129).
Taking into account the insufficiencies of the agreement that was reached, 
the members of the WTO agreed to go on with the process of reforms in the 
agricultural area. The new multilateral commercial negotiations called “Devel-
opment Agenda of Doha” included within its main objectives the reach of a 
3 The following are the quantities of categories of products corresponding to some countries that have that right: 
Canada:150, European Union: 539, Japan:121 and United States:189.
4 Suppose the transference of certain support measures from one category / box to other.
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greater liberalization of agricultural trade. Nevertheless, up to now the results 
are practically non-existent.
Towards the Cancun Meeting and the Birth of the G-20
Taking into account the terms set by the Declaration of Doha, the members 
of the WTO should come to an agreement about the modalities of negotiation 
and then present their projects of lists of ministerial compromises of the WTO 
meeting that was to be held in September 2003 in Cancun, Mexico.
Some months before the meeting in Cancun, the criteria differences among 
the member states of the WTO were evident. On the one hand, economies with 
high trade protection, like the United States, the European Union and Japan, and 
on the other, the countries of the Cairns Group which give little or no protection 
at all to their agricultural production and exports.
The European Union claimed that the weight of the modifications would 
damage the industrialized countries, that the European agricultural areas de-
served protection, not only for the commercial aspect, but also to maintain 
the multi-functionality through environmental protection, the preservation of 
landscapes, rural development and food security. It is necessary to mention 
that during this period the situation was also characterized by the Common 
Agricultural Policy reform. However, when this finally finished, subsidies were 
unchanged and allowed them to increase with the addition of ten new mem-
bers. The only difference was that part of these payments would be decoupled 
(Capdevila, 2003: 5).
Paradoxically, the United States claimed for more severe cuts on tariffs and 
taxes. The American position turns incomprehensible if considering the passing of 
the Farm Bill 2002 (in charge of regulating the refunds of the American government 
during the period 2002-2007), law that not only maintains the vast subsidies that 
the US government gave to its farmers but also adds new ones, which contradict 
the compromises assumed at the Uruguay Round (Tussie et al., 2003).
In spite of this first difference between the European Union and the United 
States, they finally developed a common framework agreement. In August 2003, 
the United States and the European Union put into consideration a shared text. 
The text included, among others, the following:
Average reduction of domestic support, instead of a compromise as  -
regards specific products.
Did not propose the elimination of the Amber Box, was silent on  -
the Blue
Box and, said nothing about strengthening disciplines in relation to  -
the Green Box,
Minimal liberalization in market access. -
The Special Agricultural Safeguards for industrialized countries  -
should be negotiated instead of being abolished.
It was absolutely ambiguous at determining up to which point the  -
export subsidies were to be eliminated (Nogues, 2004).
Besides, the joint proposal of the European Union and the United States avoided 
setting terms and mechanisms to be used. To sum up, it avoided giving answers 
to two of the main problems in developing countries, that is, the high tariffs that 
developed countries apply on the exports of their agricultural products and 
the strong supports that they give to their agricultural producers by means of 
subsidies to the production and exportation. The erratic attitude of these two 
big actors turned offensive when, not offering anything as regards agricultural 
matters, they demanded the addition to the negotiation of the Singapore is-
sues: services, investments, government purchases, property rights, etc. (Estay 
Reino, 2005: 202).
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The framework approach of the developed countries was a major de-
parture from the Doha requirement for agreement on modalities. But, what 
happened with the Cairns Group? The Cairns Group is a forum where not only 
the developing countries participate but also the developed countries do so 
(New Zealand and Australia) and where, as a consequence, the North- South 
contradictions are not expressed. Consequently, although the Group had an 
important role in the Uruguay Round, it couldn’t avoid the incorporation of the 
terms of the agreement between the United States and the European Union, 
known as Blair House Agreement. This arrangement was responsible, for in-
stance, of introducing in the Agreement of Agriculture the Clause of Peace, which 
forbids the demands to the WTO for the application of subsidies to production 
and exportation, in the frame of other agreements of the organization, like the 
Agreement on Subsidies (Ruiz Caro, 2005).
In Cancun the Cairns Group made no effective response to the US-EU 
framework. It had been undermined by differences between those who wanted 
major tariff reductions, and others who prioritized defending their domestic mar-
ket against imports. In its place, an informal coalition of countries submitted a 
joint response: it was the birth of the G-20. From this moment, the discussions 
were centered on the United States, the European Union and the G-20.
Before the Cancun summit, Brazil, South Africa, India, China and Argentina 
began to organize the future alliance among developing countries to articulate 
positions against agricultural protectionism. This group of countries from the South 
refused to accept the “pre-cooked deal” of the developed countries with the firm 
belief that such an agreement worked against their interests (Lechini, 2005). Con-
sequently, on September 2nd, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela presented a 
framework proposal for the agriculture section of the draft Ministerial Declaration. 
The G-20 proposal included an approach requiring a substantial contribution from 
developed countries. Basically, the G-20 proposed a tariff reduction formula, 
greater reductions in domestic support and an end-date for export subsidies.
In domestic support, the proposed cuts were complemented with tighter 
rules and disciplines. This would ensure that the reform process was effective 
and did not degenerate into box shifting. Furthermore, the proposal was also 
targeted to avoid the abuse of domestic support not submitted to reduction 
commitments. Export subsidies had to be eliminated. Simultaneously, tighter 
rules should be established on export credits and food aid. As regards market 
access, the G-20 proposed substantial improvements through deeper tariff cuts 
and elimination of the special safeguard for developed countries. With reference 
to developing countries, a differentiated formula was proposed in keeping with 
the capacity of these countries to contribute to the process (G-20, 2003).
The proposal presented by the G-20 showed the importance of the South- 
South cooperation since it managed to direct the needs of all the involved 
parties. On the one hand, those countries mainly oriented to the exports of 
agricultural products, which are also members of the Cairns Group, and whose 
main concerns are the policies of domestic support and the export subsidies 
applied by the developed countries. And on the other hand, countries such as 
China, India and others, whose main need is to protect their farmers from the 
changes in the pressures of the international agricultural market. In these cases 
a special consideration is required because the customs tariffs are the only 
means they have to protect the national agriculture from the thoroughly unfair 
competence from abroad.
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The Meaning of the Cancun Summit
The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization celebrated in 
Cancun in September 2003 showed the enormous resistance of the United 
Sates and the European Union to change their agricultural policies. Under 
that frame, the G-20 was formed to strengthen the negotiation capabilities of 
a group of developing countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America with the 
same needs. The G-20 strongly criticized the multilateral rules, as well as, the 
position of industrialized countries that offered only a little in agricultural matter 
and demanded a progress in those issues of their interest.
This group, and many other members from developing countries, felt 
that the previous round of trade negotiations treated them unfairly and was 
enormously damaging their economies. Under the Uruguay Round developing 
countries were promised increased trade in agriculture (and others) for agreeing 
to new rules in services, intellectual property and health and safety measures. 
Nevertheless, they discovered that in agriculture, virtually no liberalization actually 
occurred. As a result, in Cancun they demanded compensation and roll back 
of some Uruguay trade rules as a condition to undertake any new obligation in 
the Doha Round (Lloney, 2004: 132).
As Benjamin William Mkapa said,”Developing countries went to Cancun 
with two main objectives: the first one was to dismantle agricultural subsidies 
and other tariff and non- tariff barriers placed on certain agricultural and proc-
essed products in which we have a comparative advantage. We hoped, in the 
line with the Doha Development Agenda, that Cancun would lead to measures 
promoting fair trade and thus diminish our over reliance on aid and encourage 
economic growth. Our second aim was to deny the consensus needed to pro-
ceed with the so called Singapore Issues (…). Cancun came at a time when it 
was increasingly unreasonable for rich countries to ask poor ones to open up 
their markets while simultaneously delaying the gradual dismantling of their own 
agricultural production subsidies and export credits” (Mkapa, 2004).
In Cancun, WTO General Council President, Uruguayan Ambassador 
Carlos Pèrez Del Castillo, and the Ministerial Conference President, Luis Derbez, 
presented projects of ministerial declaration that included the United States 
and the European Union proposals but that did not reflect the demands of the 
developing countries. That is, their proposals reflected the fact that the two main 
parts disagreed about the substantial reduction of agricultural subsidies, but 
agreed about the demand to the developing countries of substantially reducing 
their tariffs on agricultural and industrial products. Even the European Union 
insisted up to the end on including the Singapore issues.
This unreasonable attitude not only produced the opposition of developing 
countries, which refused to sign the ministerial declaration, but also the col-
lapse of the Cancun summit. As Lal Das said “a multilateral system should be 
based on the perception of shared benefits among its members but if the great 
majority feels that the system only demanded, with no possibility of receiving, 
the system would irreversibly turn unstable” (Lal Das, 2003: 12).
Post-Cancun Scenery and the permanence of G-20
The G-20 played a very important role in the negotiations, showing that the po-
sition of the developing countries was not susceptible of any modification until 
the developed countries accepted to disarrange their protectionist agricultural 
structures. This gains importance if considering the maneuvers performed by 
the great partners of the WTO tending to disarticulate the actions of the group 
during and after the meeting in Cancun.
In fact, at the end of the meeting in Cancun, The European Union and, 
above all, the United States discredited the countries leadering the G-20, ac-
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cusing them of being responsible for hampering and leading the negotiations 
to failure. However, it is important to emphasize that the failure in Cancun was 
produced not only by the negative of the members of the group to accept the 
American-European proposal as regards agricultural issues, but also by the at-
titude of less developed countries in Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific, which 
said no to the inclusion of the Singapore issues.
The true fact is that the maneuvers to disarticulate the G-20 existed, 
mainly from the United States. The American reaction can be characterized 
by the manifestations of the US Commercial Representative, Robert Zoellick, 
who said that United States would adopt the strategy of opening each country 
out of the WTO. So, little by little the weaker country members would start to 
suffer pressures with the only objective of separating the Group. Thus, Peru, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica did not subscribe 
the declaration in Buenos Aires, which the G-20 issued in October 2003 in the 
frame of a meeting whose objective was to delineate the strategy towards the 
following WTO meeting to be held in Geneva (Ruiz Días, 2005).
During the meeting in Geneva, the General Council President, the Uru-
guayan Ambassador Carlos Perez del Castillo, and the WTO General Director, 
Suipachai Panitchpakdi, presented proposals on how to restart negotiations after 
the failure in Cancun. They suggested concentrating first on agriculture, and 
then treating the cotton issue, the access to non-agricultural markets (NAMA) 
and the Singapore issues (Khor, 2003: 3).
The G-20 was to meet again in Brasilia at the beginning of December, 
2003. In that opportunity, the president of Brazil, Lula Da Silva, “took matters 
a step further” when he proposed the establishment of an area of free trade 
with China, India and other members of the G-20 (Lechini, 2005). The Ministe-
rial Meeting was held in order to exchange views and coordinate positions on 
how to proceed with agricultural negotiations and on how to achieve progress 
in the Doha Round. Delegations from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, China, Cuba, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Venezuela and Zimbabwe attended the meeting. Ecuador and 
CARICOM were also represented in the meeting. Besides, the members of the 
group counted on the presence as special guests of two central figures for the 
negotiations, Pascal Lamy, European Union Trade Representative, and Supachai 
Panitchpadki, WTO General Director.
In Brasilia ministers highlighted that “by bringing together developing coun-
tries from Africa, the Americas and Asia, with different agricultural structures and 
orientations within a common negotiating platform, the G-20 has substantially 
contributed to making the WTO process more inclusive. The G-20 is prepared 
to continue to play an important role in that respect and to extend its coopera-
tion with other groups”. The ministers also called on WTO members to “give 
effective and substantive consideration to the concerns of Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) –as expressed before and since Cancun”. As regards the 
future negotiations ministers said that “any framework in order to be viable 
should be consistent with the Doha mandate and lead to the establishment of 
modalities capable of ensuring that negotiations in agriculture would result in 
substantial reductions in domestic support, substantial increase in market ac-
cess, phasing-out of all forms of export subsidies and operational and effective 
special and differential treatment that takes into account rural development and 
food security concerns of developing countries”(G-20, 2003).
In a following summit at the UNCTAD, the Brazilian Ambassador Seixas 
Correa, said that the developing countries have the wish to negotiate and se-
cure the satisfactory conclusion of the Doha Round, but that this will require 
substantial progresses in agricultural issues. In this sense, the access to the 
market of the agricultural products is a central issue for the developing coun-
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tries, but for such access to be guaranteed, real advances as regards internal 
support and subsidies to the exports of agricultural products are necessary 
(Raghavan, 2004a: 3).
Although in January, 2004 the Trade Representative of the United States 
proposed WTO members to substantially reduce the internal subsidies to agri-
culture and concentrate the negotiations in the support measures for trade, his 
speech was only a word game. In fact, the United States keeps the proposal 
made together with the European Union in September, 2003. Zoellik `s proposal 
only supposes the transference of certain support measures from one category 
to other, that is, from the Amber Box to the Blue Box. Furthermore, it does not 
mention the Green Box, or submit its measures to disciplines or restrictions, 
since it considers that the measures included in this category do not distort 
trade (Raghavan, 2004b: 7).
The declarations made by the United States and the European Union 
representatives after the failure in Cancun, made it clear that they would not ac-
cept restrictions to the domestic financing and support, placing this support as 
subsidies included in the Green Box, supposedly not distorting the agricultural 
markets, including the freedom to enlarge them without any norm to limit that 
right (Raja, 2004: 8). We have to add, the manifestations of certain developed 
countries in favor of postponing the Clause of Peace of the Agreement on 
Agriculture of 1994.
The basic reason that the developed countries traditionally offered to ex-
empt certain subsidies from the reduction compromises is that they do not distort 
trade. However, this is absolutely inexact, since the subsidies to the farmers of 
the industrialized countries, being of one category or other, do distort produc-
tion and trade. Although the developing countries are given the possibility to 
give certain subsidies, that possibility is unreal, since their governments do not 
possess the financial resources to do it. The fact is that the subsidies that the 
developed countries keep on applying on one way or other, have caused a loss 
of 24 000 million dollars a year in agricultural and agro-industrial incomes to the 
developing countries. The European Union would be responsible for more than 
half of that loss, and the United States for one third (Lal Das, 2004: 3).
In the negotiations on agriculture week of the WTO, held in March 2005, 
the G-20 made statements about the three bases on agricultural matters. As 
regards access to markets, the group proposed again the development of a 
wide and balanced structure that takes into account the needs of development 
of the involved countries. In this sense, an important aspect of the access to 
markets, for the developing countries is that they are permitted to implement 
instruments that benefit their small farmers and food security, as special prod-
ucts and special safeguards. As regards internal support, the G-20 claimed to 
get a substantial reduction that implies deep reductions in the general support 
that causes distortions to commerce (especially, Amber Box, Minimis Clause 
and Blue Box). It sustained that it was necessary to secure the changes so the 
different forms of internal support are not limited only to a change of label while 
the distortion effects are maintained. Finally, the G-20 demanded that it was 
elemental to reach a true and believable date for the reduction of all forms of 
export subsidies, including the indirect ones (Chien Yen, 2004: 6.9).
An encouraging fact in this stage was the sentence of the WTO favoring Bra-
zil. In April the WTO pronounced against the subsidies given by the United States 
to its cotton producers, what had caused an important fall in the prices. The other 
achievement of the Brazilian government (together with Thailand and Australia) 
was the sentence by the WTO against the European Union for the exportation 
of subsided sugar. According to the director in Brussels of OXFAM International 
(Oxford Committee for Famine Relief), the sentence on sugar was a triumph for 
the developing world and sets the death sentence to the unfair subsidies to the 
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sugar agriculture applied by the European Union (Tercer Mundo Económico, 
2004). But, it is necessary to mention that the illegal subsidies not only include 
those linked with sugar and cotton. In fact, a large quantity of other products is 
currently illegally subsidized with billions of euro and dollars each year. These 
illegal subsidies cover different agricultural products, such as, butter, orange juice, 
tobacco, tomatoes, corn and rice, among others (OXFAM, 2005a).
As regards the development of the negotiations, the G-20 met again in 
Sao Paulo on 12 June, on the occasion of the UNCTAD XI event. In that oppor-
tunity ministers restated that a special and differential treatment for developing 
members must be fully reflected in the outcome of the negotiations. They also 
recalled the idea put forward by President Lula of the possible launching of a 
free trade area among G-20 members (G-20, 2004).
On the subject of export competition ministers demanded a credible end-
date for the phasing out of all forms of export subsidies and added that to achieve 
this, a precise, effective and workable definition regarding timeframes and disci-
plines would be needed in order to ensure the elimination of direct export subsi-
dies, as well as, all forms of subsidies in export credits, food aid operations and 
state-trading enterprise activities. On the subject of domestic support ministers 
alleged that for achieving substantial reduction of domestic subsidies, there must 
be deep cuts in the sum of overall trade-distorting support, which calls for clarity 
regarding the point of departure for reduction commitments in the Blue Box. In 
addition, ministers believed that improved disciplines in distorting domestic sup-
port are required to avoid product and box shifting. As far as the Green Box is 
concerned, representatives stressed the importance of ensuring its non-trading 
distorting nature and, therefore, then need to clarify its criteria while ensuring 
transparency and accountability in its utilization. Finally, with respect to access 
to markets, ministers demanded not only a tariff reduction formula, but also an 
improvement in all other issues related to market access, such as a special safe-
guard mechanism and special products for developing countries (G-20, 2004).
On July 31st WTO members reached a framework agreement that per-
mitted the relaunching of the process of negotiations and fix certain objectives. 
The framework agreement offered an element of support for the developing 
countries, both for those members of the G-20 that have defensive interests, 
like India and China, and for those who have more efficient and competitive 
agricultural areas, like Argentina and Brazil (Raghavan, 2004c: 4). However, 
it is important to point out that, although the text of the WTO proclaimed the 
end of the agricultural subsidies, it did not establish concrete terms or precise 
mechanisms to reach that objective5. As a result, and taking into account the 
truly existent conditions, it was decided to postpone the end of the Doha Round 
for a year, until December 2006 (Evia y Gudynas, 2004: 5).
On 18 March, 2005 the G-20 met again in New Delhi to treat the substantial 
issues in agriculture towards the next WTO Ministerial Conference. On that oc-
casion G-20 ministers recalled that the Group’s identity “is deeply linked to the 
development dimension of the Doha Round. Agriculture is vital for all developing 
countries and is central to the Doha Development Agenda. Our common goal is 
to put an end to trade-distorting policies in agriculture maintained by developed 
5 Frame of modalities of negotiation in Agriculture set by WTO General Council on August 1st, 2004. Domestic 
Support: a stratified formulae will be adopted for its reduction to be later negotiated, so the members with 
higher levels of internal help causing a distortion in commerce will apply greater global reductions aiming at 
a happy result. Export subsidies: the members agreed to establish detailed modalities to secure the parallel 
elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all relative measures that have an equivalent 
effect for a final and believable date. Access to markets: the tariff reductions will be done from consolidated 
types. Substantial global tariff reductions will be obtained as a final result in the negotiations.
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countries, thus, contributing to growth and development of developing countries 
and their positive integration into the world trading system”(G-20, 2005).
As regards access to markets, the ministers pointed out that the formula 
of reduction of tariffs must include: progressiveness, that is, greater cuts to the 
higher consolidated tariffs; proportion, which implies that developing countries 
must have fewer reductions than the developed ones and flexibility to take into 
account the flexible nature of some products. Thus, the declaration highlighted 
that the special and differentiated treatment is a central element to guarantee 
food safety and rural development. Besides, they demanded the elimination of 
all export subsidies in a term of five years (Khor, 2005: 13).
Finally, the G-20 protested once more against box-shifting, that is, the 
procedure to change the subsidies in terms of the different boxes, change the 
Amber Box into Blue Box and transfer programs in the Blue to the Green one. 
The Argentine representative in the WTO, Alberto Dumont, sustained that the 
G-20 presented domestic support, claiming for an adjustment of criteria in the 
Green Box to achieve the acknowledgement of the policies that are really disas-
sociated to the direct supports to production (Capdevilla, 2005: 11).
The fact that coordinators from other developing country groups had been 
invited to the meeting in New Delhi, was a good signal of developing countries’ 
intention to work together in the preparations of the Hong Kong Ministerial con-
ference. These developing country groups, such as the G-33, the Africa Union 
and the LDCs, have serious and justifiable concerns regarding food security 
and rural livelihoods, the erosion of preferences and cotton. Consequently, the 
fact that the G-20, the most powerful southern voice in WTO negotiations, had 
an important role in order to defend also their interests, was a good step to 
strengthen even more the South-South cooperation.
Towards the Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong
The framework agreement of July 2004 had to be precise, with the propos-
als of each one of the parties involved in the trade negotiations. The deadline 
for reaching a preliminary agreement on agriculture was December 18, at the 
end of the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong. Following it, WTO 
member states will have until mid 2006 to reach a global agreement through the 
Doha Round, date by which the Trade Promotion Authority and the 2002 Farm 
Bill will expire in the United States. The areas due to submission are the three 
bases contemplated in the Agreement on Agriculture of 1994, that is, access 
to markets, domestic support and export subsidies.
A month from the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference there existed huge 
gaps in negotiating positions. Although the G-20 had presented proposals in 
all three pillars, in conformity with the Doha mandate and the July framework, 
the proposals made by United States and the European Union were insufficient. 
Consequently, the state members of the G-20 firmly criticized them. As regards 
the European Union proposal, the G-20 alleged, among others, that it provided 
for only marginal improvement in market access. With reference to domestic 
Support, the group similarly saw that the United States proposal felt short of 
responding to G-20 demands, that there had to be real cuts in all forms of 
trade-distorting domestic support and effective new disciplines. With respect 
to export competition the members of the group assumed that a credible end 
date was still missing in the proposals presented. Finally, the G-20 believed that 
developed members proposals had not incorporated adequately special and dif-
ferential treatment for developing countries. For the G-20 this would be obtained 
through ensuring proportionality of commitments and developing the concepts 
of special products and special safeguard mechanism (G-20, 2005).
As OXFAM said, “in October 2005, in an effort to rekindle momentum prior 
to Hong Kong, the USA and EU made proposals on agriculture that purported 
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to offer major progress on all three ‘pillars’ of the agriculture agreement (do-
mestic support, export competition and market access). On a closer inspection, 
however, the proposals proved to be more spin than substance, offering few 
or no real cuts in subsidies or tariffs and insisting on numerous loopholes to 
allow governments to continue to heavily subsidize agriculture and dump the 
surplus on world markets. Even then, the EU demanded a quid pro quo in the 
form of greatly improved access for European industries to developing country 
markets” (OXFAM, 2005b).
The proposals of the two big players of the WTO did not respond to the 
demands formulated with insistence by the developing countries. The true fact 
is that proposals of the European Union and the United States would not result 
in real cuts in levels of support. For instance, the United States offered to lower 
its import tariffs by between 55 and 90%, and to cut subsidies by 60%, but only 
if the European Union and Japan reduce theirs by 80%, as it considers them 
to be currently higher. But the United States’ offer to cut its overall subsidiza-
tion of agriculture was a deception. In fact, it was a cut from allowable levels of 
support, not from actual and current levels. As a result, it would not only allow 
the current level of government support to continue but provided space for it 
to rise. Besides, there were no concrete commitments to significantly reduce 
the Green Box subsidies. And, indeed, the United States continues to press for 
the expansion of its Blue Box to accommodate the subsidies legislated by the 
2002 Farm Bill. Finally, there were no concrete commitments to cut food aid or 
reduce export credits, which are forms of export subsidies (Bello, 2006).
Concerning the United States proposal, Celso Amorim, minister of External 
Relations of Brazil, said that it was insufficient, that it did not have clear disci-
plines in the Blue Box area and had to be improved in terms of the numbers for 
Amber Box support. With respect to the tariff reduction formula, Kamal Nath, 
Indian Minister for Commerce, said that the United States needed to give full 
respect to the framework that says that the formula will take into consideration 
the different tariff structures of developing countries (Raja, 2005).
With reference to the European Union proposal, it included a reduction 
of 46% in the agricultural tariffs, although a large quantity of sensitive products 
would be excluded. The proposal also included an average reduction of do-
mestic support and the commitment to give an end date to export subsidies. 
But the date proposed by the Europeans was not established, while the G-20 
demanded determinedly 2010 as a top date. Moreover, as regard export subsi-
dies it is necessary to mention that, although a large proportion of EU supports 
go into subsidizing exports, only a small part is classified as export subsidies. 
Consequently, the results of its elimination will be definitively unfair. Furthermore, 
one of the most questionable attitudes of the European Union was the pres-
sure that developing countries received to widely open their own markets as 
counterweight to the insufficient European proposal. In fact, Peter Mandelson, 
EU Trade commissioner, said that concessions that European Union gives in 
agriculture will have to be linked to real market access openings in developing 
countries in industrial goods and services (Chien Yen, 2005).
Taking into account the pre-existent differences, before Hong Kong summit 
it was not possible to reach an agreement as regards the pattern of modalities 
(approaches, formula and numbers) on agriculture or on NAMA issues, serv-
ices, special and differentiated treatment to developing countries, problems of 
application, facilities to commerce and intellectual property.
The Hong Kong Conference
The Ministerial Conference celebrated in Hong Kong had no positive results 
in terms of advantages for the developing world. The final text was only the 
formal conclusion of the meeting, with little progress in agricultural matters, 
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but with considerable points in favor of developed economies. Perhaps, the 
most relevant issue in Hong Kong was the fact that different groups, including 
the G-20, came together to form an alliance called G-110 with the purpose of 
exercising pressure on the European Union and United States to reform their 
agriculture regimes.
In this sense, the G-20 had asked Brazil to convene a meeting with min-
isters from the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), African 
Union, LDCs, and G-33 to start a common process. In Hong Kong the ministers 
of developing countries emphasized that they intended to work together on 
agricultural reform and policy space in developing countries and manage any 
disagreements to prevent the European Union or United States from using the 
so well known divide and rule tactics (OXFAM, 2005b). In this context, Indian 
minister, Kamal Nath, said that G-20, G-33 and G-90 were going to stand up 
for the rights of their constituencies (Focus on the Global South, 2005a).
But in spite of the efforts developing countries made to obtain an integral 
reform of the agricultural protectionist structures existent in the rich countries, 
the final result of the Hong Kong summit was nominal. The closing ministerial 
declaration contained some relative gains on agriculture. In the first place, there 
was some progress to agree on new disciplines to stop developed countries 
abuse of food aid. In the second place, the conference has some more flexibil-
ity to protect peasants in developing countries. The text includes both Special 
Products and a Special Safeguard Mechanism. According to this, for instance, 
developing countries can decide themselves which products need to be pro-
tected to safeguard food security, rural development and the livelihoods of poor 
farmers. In third the place, developing countries would have exempted from cuts 
their agricultural subsidies under the minimis clause. Finally, in Hong Kong the 
language on domestic support issues was strengthened (OXFAM, 2005b).
But WTO Conference in Hong Kong did not deal with the substantial 
issues of the agricultural problem. That is to say, it did not establish concrete 
numbers in terms of subsidies and tariffs reduction. There were no real cuts in 
domestic support and export subsidies by the European Union and the United 
States in the new framework text. As regards the identification of 2013 as an 
end date for export subsidies, it is necessary to mention that this date was 
longer than almost all developing countries wanted (2010 at least) and that 
export subsidies represent the minor part of the farm support. Besides, as it 
was previously mentioned in the case of the European export subsidies, only 
a small part is currently classified as export subsidies. The truth is that most 
of them fall into the Green Box which, regrettably, again avoided disciplines in 
the last negotiations. As a result, export subsidies were proscribed, but hidden 
export subsidies in the Green Box will replace the forbidden ones (Focus on 
the Global South, 2005b).
Furthermore, there were no real cuts in domestic support. Although EU 
offered to cut trade distorting domestic supports by 70% and the United States 
by 60%, these supports only cut into resources they are not currently provid-
ing to these framers. Consequently, it does not make any cut into their present 
applied levels. The evident result is the acceptance that in October the United 
States and the European Union offered proposals in which there were no real 
cuts into their supports (Focus on the Global South, 2005a).
The Hong Kong ministerial meeting was a missed opportunity to make 
trade fairer. Developed countries put their commercial interests before those of 
developing ones and the most difficult decisions were postponed6. The final text 
6  The most important agricultural issues are to be solved within a deadline of 30 April 2006 for agreement on 
modalities and country schedules by 31 July 2006.
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was insufficient in order to address and revert the distortions caused by exces-
sive levels of domestic support and exportation subsidies (their real amount) in 
the developed countries. Furthermore, as regards access to markets the text 
established developed countries are able to protect an unspecified number of 
sensitive products.
As a result, another time developing countries were forced to put off their 
own interests. Perhaps the next WTO meeting at a beginning of 2006 found 
developing states much more prepared to afford the developed world chal-
lenges. As the Hong Kong’s Conference showed, there existed a first step in 
order to conform a great South- South alliance called G-110, of which G-20 was 
a member. But this first step was already insufficient, that is, the reason why the 
final text did not respond to the demands of developing states and that is why 
another time the development agenda was postponed.
Final Considerations
The ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization celebrated in Cancun 
in September, 2003 showed the enormous resistance of industrialized countries 
to change their agricultural policies. In that opportunity, the United Sates and 
the European Union became allies to avoid the disarticulation of its protectionist 
structures. Under that frame, the G-20 was formed to strengthen the negotiation 
capabilities of a group of developing countries with the same needs. This group 
strongly criticized the multilateral rules, as well as, the position of certain indus-
trialized countries that offered only a little in agricultural matter and demanded 
a progress in those themes of their interest: services, inversions, government 
purchases, property rights, etcetera.
The birth of the G-20 as a South-South cooperation forum allowed its 
members to paralyze the negotiations of the WTO, negotiations that sought 
the consecution of the United States and the European Union objectives, but 
that paid no attention to the needs of the developing countries involved. After 
Cancun, the G-20 suffered multiple attacks with the objective of dividing and 
weakening it; however, the group managed to stay in the international scenery 
as a valid interlocutor for the central powers in the international negotiations. 
Although some countries withdrew as a result of the pressures received, both 
by the US and by the European Union, the G-20 continued demanding a greater 
equality in the international commerce relations.
Maybe the most outstanding work done by the G-20 was the claim to the 
South-South cooperation. That is, although the G-20 constantly demanded the 
liberalization of the commercial flows and the elimination of tariff barriers and 
agricultural subsidies, it proclaimed at the same time the need to defend the 
internal agricultural structures of those developing and less developed countries 
where serious poverty problems and rural marginality exist. Perhaps, this attitude 
responds to the fact that the group has a heterogeneous composition, since it 
includes not only important agricultural exporters but also net importers, mem-
bers apparently of divergent interests and of different degrees of protectionism, 
but linked with the purpose of fighting the internal and export subsidies existent 
in the developed countries and claiming to a greater access to the agricultural 
markets of those countries.
As the recent negotiations showed, the G-20 has a lot of challenges 
ahead of it. In the first place, to assure the elimination of all export subsidies, to 
eliminate effectively the measures of support to internal production that distort 
commerce and to drastically reduce the prohibited tariffs imposed by indus-
trialized countries to its agricultural products. In the second place, to extend 
the work of the group to other areas of interest of developing countries and 
increase the number of members. In this sense, despite not being enough, 
the informal conformation of the G-110 during the Hong Kong summit was an 
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important step in order to enhance the south alliance. Finally, another important 
defy involves the biggest members of the G-20 (China, India and Brazil), which 
should maintain the solidarity with the less developed countries of the group 
and the rest of the developing world. That is, the largest states should have the 
consciousness that in the long term this is the most adequate strategy for the 
entire developing world, including them.
But perhaps currently the most important task for the group is to remain 
throughout the passing of time, to avoid its dissolution, to act on behalf of the 
developing countries, to defend and promote their interests by means of coor-
dinated and collective actions. Until now, the work of its members has made it 
impossible to impose a new regime as regards agricultural issues; however, since 
Cancun the G-20 has contributed to the idea that the South-South cooperation 
is still possible; that is, the idea that the cooperation among developing countries 
can result in the coming of a fairer trade and economic system.
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